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UTAH R. APP, P. 24(A)(1) STATEMENT OF ALL PARTIES T O THE FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURT & 10™ CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL PROCEEDINGS 
1. Plaintiffs Timothy A. Tabor and Debra J. Tabor; 
2. Plaintiff Farmers Insurance Company; 
3. Defendant The Metal Ware Corporation, a Wisconsin corporation; 
4. Defendant Nesco/American Harvest Corp., a Wisconsin corporation; 
5. Defendant Newco of Two Rivers, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation; 
6. Defendant Uvalko Shopko Stores, Inc., a Minnesota corporation; and 
7. Defendant Englewood Appliance Co., Inc., a Wisconsin Corporation. 
Defendants Uvalko Shopko Stores, Inc. and Englewood Appliance 
Company, Inc., settled out of this matter and were dismissed from the litigation by 
the United States District Court, District of Utah, Judge Tena J. Campbell, on July 
22, 2004. See R. at Farmers5 Fed. App. 24 (Federal District Court Docket entry 
No. 147 (July 22, 2004). 
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2, which extends this Court's jurisdiction "to answer questions of state 
tit 
law certified by a court of the United States." See also 10 Cir. Civ. R. 27.1 and Utah 
R. App.P. 41. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified these issues: 
A. Does Utah law recognize an exception to the general rule of successor 
non-liability under the circumstances of this case? 
B. Does Utah law impose on successor corporations a post-sale duty to 
independently warn customers of defects in products manufactured and sold by the 
predecessor corporation? If so, what factors should determine whether a successor has 
discharged that duty? 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit made no ruling on 
these issues, but rather has certified them to the Utah Supreme Court for decision. 
Accordingly, the resolution of these issues is before the Utah Supreme Court in the 
first instance and there is no applicable standard of appellate review. However, insofar 
as the Utah Supreme Court endeavors to review the United States' District Court's 
rulings on these issues {see Record, Appellant Farmers Insurance Company's 
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Appendix (hereinafter "Farmers' Fed. App.") at 53-68 & 69-76), the standard of 
review of a trial court's summary judgment determinations is de novo, for correctness. 
Decius v. Action Collections Service, Inc, 2004 UT App. 484, 105 P.3d 956, 958 f7 
(Utah Ct. App.). 
III. PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT 
These issues were presented to the United States District Court, District or Utah, 
and were ruled upon by the Honorable Tena Campbell. See Farmer's Fed. App. at 62-
66, 71-76, 203-04, & 247-63. 
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES & REGULATIONS 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules 
or regulations. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this products liability action, a food dehydrator manufactured by American 
Harvest and purchased by Tim and Debra Tabor caused a fire and significant damage 
in the Tabors' home. Thereafter, pursuant to an insurance contract, Appellant Farmers 
paid approximately $255,186.57 to or on behalf of the Tabors. 
On August 17,1995, the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission 
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(hereinafter "USCPSC") announced a recall of 56,843 of American Harvest's food 
dehydrators because the "heating element in the food dehydrators can overheat, 
presenting a fire hazard." The USCPSC imposed a continuing obligation on American 
Harvest to report any "information concerning other incidents or injuries, or 
information that affects the scope, prevalence or seriousness of the defect or hazard." 
Without knowledge of the recall, the Tabors purchased an American Harvest 
food dehydrator from a Utah Shopko store in the spring of 1996. 
On April 2, 1997 American Harvest and Metal Ware, through a shell company 
named Newco, entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement whereby Metal Ware 
intended to purchase American Harvest's assets, but not its liabilities. Metal Ware 
retained key American Harvest employees, honored all American Harvest service 
contracts, maintained use of the American Harvest name and its customer service 
telephone number, and maintained relationships with American Harvest's customers. 
In December 1997, nearly a year prior to the November 1998 fire that destroyed 
the Tabors' home, Metal Ware received notice of a defective FD-50 food dehydrator 
that caused a fire in an Oklahoma residence. Metal Ware made no effort to warn the 
Tabors, either directly or indirectly, of the ongoing safety danger presented by the 
product line it acquired from American Harvest. Thereafter, a fire caused by the 
Tabors' defective American Harvest dehydrator destroyed the Tabors' home and its 
3 
contents. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW & DISPOSITION 
On June 29,1999, Plaintiffs Tim and Debra Tabor filed their Complaint in the 
underlying case, number 2:99-cv-00503. On November 16, 2000, Farmers filed its 
subrogation action in case number 2:00-cv-898, which arose out of the same set of 
facts as the Tabors' action. On January 23, 2002, the Tabors filed a motion to 
consolidate case number 2:99-cv-00503 with Farmers' case number 2.-OO-cv-898. On 
October 15,2002, the trial court granted the motion to consolidate the two cases, and 
the matter proceeded under case number 2:99-cv-00503. On October 29, 2002, 
Plaintiff Farmers filed its Third Amended Complaint. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 
27-38. 
On March 8, 2002, Metal Ware filed its first motion for summary judgment 
seeking dismissal of all causes of action based on Metal Ware's April 2, 1997 Asset 
Purchase Agreement with American Harvest and contending the following clause 
absolved Metal Ware of any liability arising out of the 1998 Tabor fire: 
Purchaser [Metal Ware] shall not assume or become liable for any 
contracts, obligations or liabilities of seller (including, but not limited to, 
accounts payable, payroll, accrued liabilities, bank debt, loans payable, 
product liability, warranty liability or any tax liability) and seller 
[American Harvest] shall indemnify and hold purchaser harmless from 
any liability arising out of any such contract, obligations or liabilities — 
4 
On October 15, 2002, the trial court denied Metal Ware's first motion for summary 
judgment, without prejudice, to permit further discovery. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 
52. 
On January 15, 2003, Metal Ware filed its second motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that all claims against Metal Ware fail based on the foregoing no 
assumption of liabilities clause in the 1997 Asset Purchase Agreement. On September 
8,2003, the trial court granted in part and denied in part Metal Ware's second motion 
for summary judgment. The trial court refused to recognize the product line or 
continuity of enterprise theories of successor liability under Utah law and, thus, 
dismissed all claims under a product distribution theory and pursuant to the general 
rule of non-liability for a successor corporation. However, the trial court denied Metal 
Ware's motion to the extent the plaintiffs asserted a duty to warn. See R. at Farmers' 
Fed. App. 53-68. 
On December 1,2003, Metal Ware filed its third motion for summary judgment, 
this time challenging the duty to warn theory based on the plaintiffs' purported failure 
to plead a duty to warn in their respective complaints, and based on Metal Ware's 
assertion it had no knowledge of and therefore ability to warn the Tabors. On April 26, 
2004, the trial court denied Metal Ware's third motion for summary judgment because 
the plaintiffs had specifically and sufficiently pled a duty to warn theory of liability. In 
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addition, the court held that "Utah law would impose a duty to warn on a successor 
corporation" and, based on the facts of this case, determined that Metal Ware had a 
duty to warn. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 69-76 (emphasis added). 
On June 9,2004, the trial court entered its final Trial Order setting the matter for 
a four-day jury trial on July 12, 2004, which date was later vacated. R. at Farmers' 
Fed. App. 77-82. 
On June 24, 2004, Metal Ware filed its fourth motion for summary judgment, 
also on the duty to warn issue, again alleging it had no duty to warn and could not be 
held liable on a failure to warn theory because it had no knowledge of the Tabors. The 
trial court summarily denied Metal Ware's fourth summary judgment motion by its 
Order of July 9, 2004. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 83. 
On December 9,2004, Metal Ware filed its fifth motion for summary judgment, 
this time on the issue of causation arguing the testimony of Shopko's director of 
vendor compliance was insufficient to establish causation—namely that a warning to 
Shopko would have prevented the subject fire in the Tabors' home. See R. at Farmers' 
Fed. App. 218-223. The Tabors and Farmers countered arguing the Shopko 
representative's testimony demonstrated a warning to the retail store would have 
resulted in warnings to the general public that would have put the Tabors on notice of 
the product defect. SeeR. at Farmers' Fed. App. 86-113,155-60,203-05. On May 20, 
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2005, the trial court granted Metal Ware's motion for summary judgment on causation. 
In doing so, the trial court opined that the Shopko representative was unable to 
conclusively testify what the store would have done had it received a warning from 
Metal Ware. Based on this interpretation of the Shopko representative's testimony, the 
trial court dismissed the last remaining cause of action against Metal Ware and entered 
its May 20, 2005 Judgment in a Civil Case. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 116-124. 
Thereafter, Farmers and the Tabors appealed to the United States Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which heard argument on May 8,2006 and subsequently issued its 
Certification of Questions of State Law to the Utah Supreme Court on May 26,2006. 
VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about August 17,1995, the United States Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (hereinafter "USCPSC") announced a recall of 56,843 food dehydrators 
because the "heating element in the food dehydrators can overheat, presenting a fire 
hazard." See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 355-57 (WI 0259 to WI 0260). 
2. Without knowledge of the recall, the Tabors purchased an American 
Harvest dehydrator from a Utah Shopko store in the spring of 1996. See R. at Farmers' 
Fed. App. 54. 
3. According to Metal Ware, Metal Ware formed Newco in order to 
purchase the assets of American Harvest. Subsequent to the transaction, Newco 
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merged with its parent corporation, Metal Ware, and ceased to exist. See R. at Tabors' 
Fed. App. 489-490 (Drumm Depo. at 17:9 to 18:12). 
4. Metal Ware's primary objective in purchasing the assets of American 
Harvest was to secure the right to manufacture and sell the American Harvest line of 
food dehydrators. See R. at Tabors' Fed. App. 511-12 (Drumm Depo. at 105:24 to 
106:3). 
5. Prior to Metal Ware's purchase of American Harvest's assets, Metal 
Ware's President, Wesley C. Drumm, was well-aware of the USCPSC recall involving 
the American Harvest food dehydrators which Metal Ware specifically sought to 
manufacture and sell. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 268-76 (Drumm Depo. at 40:15-
21, 42:7-22, 43:5-21, 49:9-13, 71:16-22, 86:15-21, and 106:4-6). 
6. On April 3, 1997, a Metal Ware press release announced (1) the 
acquisition of American Harvest's assets, (2) Metal Ware had "retained many of the 
key employees" of American Harvest, (3) the companies had "distribution channels 
that are almost identical", and (4) American Harvest's founders, David Dornbush and 
Chad Erickson, would be continuing with Metal Ware. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 
278-79. 
7. Despite Metal Ware's knowledge of the USCPSC recall and its hiring of 
American Harvest's key employees, Metal Ware did nothing to follow-up on the recall 
8 
and/or to warn consumers of the dangers of the defective product placed into the 
stream of commerce by its predecessor. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 268-76 (Drumm 
Depo. at 40:22-25,41:1-7,44:8-14,44:23 to45:12,49:1-8,72:12to 73:10, and 88:21 
to 89:20). 
8. One concern during the negotiation of the April 2,1997 Asset Purchase 
Agreement was that Metal Ware "did not want to be liable for any past sins" of 
American Harvest, including avoiding "the trailings of product liability." See R. at 
Tabors' Fed. App. 474 (Erickson Depo. at 21:13-25), and R. at Tabors' Fed. App. 457 
(Dornbush Depo. at 41:7-17). 
9. Metal Ware's President testified of his long-term association with 
American Harvest's product distributor, Englewood, his personal relationship with 
principals thereof, and his knowledge of Englewood's ongoing distributor relationship 
with Shopko. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 274 (Drumm Depo. at 94:22 to 96:10). 
10. In order to sell its dehydrators, Metal Ware used many of the same 
distributors originally used by American Harvest prior to the purchase of assets. See 
R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 276 (Drumm Depo. at 118:24 to 119:2). 
11. In fact, Englewood remained one of Metal Ware's top customers, and 
from June through December 1997 alone, Englewood sold $645,744.60 worth of Metal 
Ware merchandise. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 281 (WI 0989, TOPSLS.XLS 
9 
Top7mo~Table showing Englewood as third highest seller of Metal Ware products); 
id. at 283-286 (WI0884 to WI0888,1997 Sales Report); seealsoid. at296(WI0140, 
Facsimile to Metal Ware (Aug. 24, 1998) (announcing dehydrator orders for 
Englewood/Shopko)). In 1998, Englewood sold $359,983.20 in Metal Ware 
merchandise. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 289-93 (WI 0868 to WI 0873,1998 Sales 
Report). By comparison, the year prior to Metal Ware's acquisition of the American 
Harvest assets, Englewood generated $592,200.00 in FD-50 dehydrator gross sales. 
SeeR. at Farmers' Fed. App. 298 (WI 0350, 1996 Gross Sales Report). 
12. On April 10, 1997, former American Harvest vice president Steve 
Twedell wrote to American Harvest's toll-free telephone service provider to inform 
that "NESCO/American Harvest Corp.1 is interested in utilizing the '800' numbers 
previously used by American Harvest, Inc. without interruption." See R. at Farmers' 
Fed. App. 300 (WI 1273, Twedell letter to AT&T Account Executive Deborah Smith 
(Apr. 10,1997)). Metal Ware's president, Wesley C.Drumm, was provided a courtesy 
copy of this correspondence. See id. 
13. Following Metal Ware's asset purchase, it sent a letter to prior American 
Harvest retailers announcing that Metal Ware "will soon begin filling your product 
needs with the American Harvest ® brand of the finest in Electric Dehydrators and 
1
 Nesco/American Harvest is the brand named used by Metal Ware. 
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Accessories." See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 306 (WI 1008, Anderson Letter to 
Retailers (attached as Ex. 11)). 
14. On July 1, 1997, operating under the name Nesco/American Harvest 
Corp., Metal Ware sent American Harvest's former service center representatives a 
letter advising that "[warranties for all products produced by American Harvest will 
be honored" by Nesco/American Harvest. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 308 (WI 
0376, Bonheyo letter to Service Center Representatives). 
15. On August 25,1997, operating under the name Nesco/AmericanHarvest 
Corp., Metal Ware sent a letter to retailers noting the new company "stands behind 
their electrical appliances and will continue to process return authorization requests on 
defective items from other NESCO/American Harvest product lines." See R. at 
Farmers' Fed. App. 310 (WI 0993, Wendorff letter to Retailers (Aug. 25, 1997)). 
16. In December 1997, Metal Ware sent "to approximately 125 service 
centers previously aligned with American Harvest," seeR. at Farmers' Fed. App. 322, 
a domestic service center agreement under cover of a letter announcing Metal Ware's 
procedure for handling all warranty and non-warranty repairs of American Harvest 
products including all model FD-30/50 food dehydrators. See R. at Farmers' Fed. 
App. 312-22 (WI 0995 to WI 1005, Service Center Representative packet (Dec. 1, 
1997)). 
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17. In December 1997, thus nearly a year prior to the November 1998 fire that 
destroyed the Tabor's home, Metal Ware received notice of a defective FD-50 food 
dehydrator unit that caused a fire in the home of an Oklahoma resident. See R. at 
Farmers' Fed. App. 324 (WI 0019, Barton facsimile to Youngchild (Dec. 5, 1997)). 
18. At all times relevant hereto following the asset purchase agreement, Metal 
Ware/Newco had in its possession correspondence between American Harvest's vice 
president of engineering and the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission 
documenting the history of and basis for the FD-50 food dehydrator recall. See R. at 
Farmers' Fed. App. 326-344 (WI 0146 to WI 0164, USCPSC Recall Information). 
This correspondence included July 25, 1995 and February 23, 1996 letters from the 
USCPSC, which imposed the affirmative duty to continue a corrective action program 
and to report all "information concerning other incidents or injuries, or information that 
affects the scope, prevalence or seriousness of the defect or hazard." See id. at 328 
(WI 0148) & 331 (WI 0151). 
19. Also in Metal Ware's possession at all relevant times was the July 26, 
1995 correspondence sent by American Harvest to Englewood warning of the defective 
FD-50 food dehydrators. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 346-49 (WI 0397 to WI 0400, 
Giambruno facsimile & letter to Lunderville (July 27, 1995)). 
20. Further, at all times relevant hereto, Metal Ware/Newco had in its 
12 
possession packets which were sent to American Harvest retailers of the FD-50 food 
dehydrators describing the USCPSC consumer notification and remedial action plan 
and advising of the means available to retailers to warn nonregistered consumers of 
the products defects "with notices posted in retail stores and through the general media 
via a press release." See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 351-60 (WI 0255 to WI 0264, 
American Harvest letter and information to Montgomery Ward (Aug. 16, 1995)). 
21. One such document within Metal Ware's possession explicitly spelled out 
the means available to contact unknown consumers: 
Non-registered Consumers 
The only means available to usto contact non-registered consumers are 
with notices posted in retail stores and through the general media via a 
press release. Attached is the in-store notice that we would ask you to 
post at your retail outlets. If you have any questions on where to post or 
need additional copies, please do not hesitate to contact us. 
Also attached is the text of the Press Release which is scheduled for 
release on Thursday, August 17. This notice was prepared in conjunction 
with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission. Please note: this 
copy of the press release is CONFIDENTIAL and for your internal use 
only. It must not be issued by any agency other than the U.S. Consumer 
Product Safety Commission. 
These actions may generate consumer inquiries to your stores. Please 
instruct store personnel to request that theconsumers contact American 
Harvest directly, through our published 800#, for guidance regarding the 
inspection and repair of their dehydrators. 
R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 353 (emphasis in original); see also R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 
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355-59 (documents referenced in Farmers' Fed. App. p.353). 
22. Despite Metal Ware's knowledge of the prior USCPSC recall and its 
hiring of a number of key employees of American Harvest, despite Metal Ware's 
exclusive control over all documentation outlining the recall procedure and how to 
contact even non-registered customers, despite Metal Ware's commitment to repair the 
defective products, and despite Metal Ware's ongoing stream of income from the 
defective product line, once Metal Ware became aware of another dehydrator fire in 
December 1997 it did nothing to follow-up on the recall and/or to warn consumers of 
the ongoing dangers of the defective product. See R. at Farmers Fed. App. 253 at ffl[ 
20 & 22, id. at 269-71 (Drumm Depo. at 40:22-25, 41:1-7, 44:8-14, 44:23 to 45:12, 
49:1-8), id. at 272 (Drumm Depo. at 72:12 to 73:10), and id. at 273 (Drumm Depo. at 
88:21 to 89:20). 
23. Farmers' Third Amended Complaint alleged a general failure to warn, 
which encompasses the duty of Metal Ware to warn the Tabors through any reasonable 
means available. SeeR. atFarmers' Fed. App. 27-39(1^ 17,19,29,30,36,37,43,61, 
62, 66, 73 & 74). 
24. The trial court held that Metal Ware, as a successor corporation, hadan 
ongoing duty to warn consumers such as the Tabors of the defect or ongoing danger 
presented by the FD-50 food dehydrator. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 73-76 & 83. 
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25. The trial court also rejected Metal Ware's argument that it had no 
knowledge of the identity of the Tabors and therefore no ability to personally warn 
them. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 83 (denying Metal Ware's Fourth Motion for 
Summary Judgment); see also R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 75-76 (recognizing means 
available to Metal Ware to contact unknown members of the general public). 
26. Shopko's supervisor of vendor compliance, Shelley Schroeder, testified 
that, had Shopko received notice from Metal Ware of a FD-50 food dehydrator defect 
that caused a residential fire, it would have considered the matter a "severe" injury. 
See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 152 at f 8, and/d. at 178 (Schroeder Depo. at 50:3-7). 
27. Schroeder also testified that, had Shopko received notice from Metal 
Ware, it would have followed its standard plan for dealing with a recalled product: 
She would have met with corporate counsel to devise a plan of action, which would 
include removing the product from Shopko shelves, and providing notice to members 
of the general public by posting signs in the store at the point of sale and at the 
customer service desk. SeeR. at Farmers' Fed. App. 100:15 to 105:25;R. at Farmers' 
Fed. App. 152 ay f 8; R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 170 (Schroeder Depo. at 20:20 to 
21:4); R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 176-77 (Schroeder Depo. at 42:11 to 46:25); R. at 
Farmers' Fed. App. 177-78 (Schroeder Depo. at 49:15 to 51:1). 
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VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Utah law, and under the facts of this case, Metal Ware was a mere 
continuation of the selling corporation, American Harvest, and therefore should be 
strictly liable in products liability under one of the four exceptions to the traditional 
rule of successor corporation non-liability. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court should 
adopt both the product line and continuity of enterprise exceptions to the traditional 
rule of successor non-liability under which Metal Ware is additionally strictly liable for 
the defective product that burned the Tabors' home to the ground. 
Further, a successor corporation, with knowledge of a product defect as Metal 
Ware indisputably had in this matter, has an independent duty to warn consumers 
regardless of the nature of the contractual relationship between the predecessor and 
successor corporations. The burden of substantial consumer losses must be borne by 
the entities generating profits off of the ongoing sales of products and the goodwill 
established by predecessor corporations. The decision whether a successor corporation 
has discharged its duty to warn should turn on the reasonableness of the successor 
corporation's actions under the facts of the given case. In this instance, Metal Ware 
made no duty to warn and was therefore negligent per se. 
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VIII. ARGUMENT 
A. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE OF SUCCESSOR NON-LIABILITY APPLY 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
1. TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO SUCCESSOR NON-LIABILITY APPLY 
Utah law recognizes, generally, that where a company purchases the assets of 
another company, the purchasing company does not acquire the debts or liabilities of 
the seller. Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 986 P.2d 748, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999),a#'dl6P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000); see also Florom v. ElliottMfg., 867F.2d570, 
575 n.2 (10 Cir. 1989) ("[W]here one company sells or otherwise transfers all its 
assets to another company the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the 
transferor."). However, Utah courts have recognized four exceptions to this general 
rule where:"(1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts; (2) 
the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the seller and purchaser; (3) the 
purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or (4)he 
transaction is entered fraudulently in order to escape liability for such debts." 986 P.2d 
at 752 (citing Florom, 867 F.2d at 575 n.2); see also Case v. Paul Troester 
Maschinenfabrik 139F. Supp.2d428,430(W.D.N.Y. 2001); Garciav. Coe,933 P.2d 
243,247 (N.M. 1997); and/.F. Anderson Lumber v. Myers, 206 N.W.2d 365,368-69 
(Minn. 1973). 
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In this case, the facts support a finding that Metal Ware was merely a 
continuation of the selling corporation. Metal Ware purchased American Harvest to 
obtain the American Harvest name and dehydrator product line and to take advantage 
of American Harvest's goodwill and name recognition. Metal Ware continued to 
employ American Harvest's founders and its key personnel, sold the identical product 
under the very same American Harvest name, utilized the same tool free customer 
service number as American Harvest, entered service contracts with American 
Harvest's service providers, and honored all of American Harvest's warranties. 
Meanwhile, after the asset purchase, American Harvest ceased to exist leaving persons 
such as the Tabors with no remedy in products liability absent the successor 
corporation's liability. 
2. PRODUCT LINE AND CONTINUITY OF ENTERPRISE EXCEPTIONS 
The undisputed testimonies of Metal Ware's president and corporate secretary, 
Wesley Drumm and Linda Youngchild, respectively, provide unequivocal evidence 
satisfyingthe "product line" and "continuity of enterprise" exceptions to the traditional 
rule of successor non-liability. 
a. PRODUCT LINE EXCEPTION 
Under the product line exception, where a purchasing entity buys all or 
substantially all of the assets of a selling entity and continues essentially the same 
18 
operation as the selling corporation, the purchasing entity remains strictly liable for 
injuries caused by a defective product of the same product line, even if the defective 
product was manufactured and distributed by the selling entity or its predecessor. See 
63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 133 (1996); see also, e.g., Case, 139F. Supp. 2d at 
434; Andrews v. JohnE. Smith's Sons Co.,369 So. 2d 781,785-86 (Ala. 1979); Nieves 
v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 431 A.2d 826, 830-31 (N.J. 1981); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 
P.2d 3 (Cal 1977). Under this theory, the successor retains product liability after an 
asset purchase where the successor (1) acquires substantially all the assets of the 
predecessor, (2) continues to distribute the product under the same or similar name, 
and (3) continues to hold itself out as a continuation of the predecessor, benefiting 
from the predecessor's goodwill. 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 133 (1996); 
Nieves, 431 A.2d at 830-31; Ray, 560 P.2d at 8-10; George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 
507, 510 (Wash. 1987); Case, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 434 ("This exceptionprovides that 
' when a corporation buys substantially all of the assets of a corporate manufacturer and 
thereafter continues essentially the same manufacturing operation it may be strictly 
liable for defects in products in the same line even though they were in factnade by 
the predecessor."). 
Alternatively stated, the product line exception "'seeks to establish whether there 
is a substantial continuity in the products resulting from the pretransaction and 
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posttransactionuse of the predecessor's assets.'" Garcia, 933 P.2d at 247 (emphasis in 
original) (quoting 1 Timothy E. Travers et al, American Law of Products Liability 
§7:20 at 37 (3r ed. 1994)). In Garcia, the court adopted the product line exception in 
order to protect "an injured person who may be left without a remedy if the 
predecessor has dissolved, is defunct, or is otherwise unavailable to respond in 
damages." 933 P.2d at 247. Finally, three additional reasons weigh in favor of the 
product-line exception: 
First, the buyer company is in a better position to bear the expense of the 
injury that the victim. Second, a manufacturer buyer is able to spread the 
cost of the injury to future consumers. And third, because a manufacturer 
buyer profits from the predecessor's goodwill and reputation, it is unfair 
to allow the buyer to succeed to the seller purposes of sales but not 
liability. 
Decius, 2004 UT App. 484,105 P.3d at 960114; see also Ray, 560 P.2d at 9 (citing as 
basis for successor liability: (1) unavailability of remedy to plaintiff, (2) successor 
knowledge of risk to consumer, and (3) predecessor's goodwill enhanced sales of 
successor). Indeed, "[b]ecause 'strict liability focuses on the product,' and not on 
conduct, it is not unfair to assess liability to successor manufacturers who have 
purchased the right to benefit from selling and servicing the product." Garcia, 933 
P.2d at 249-50 (citation omitted). 
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b. CONTINUITY OF ENTERPRISE EXCEPTION 
Under the continuity of enterprise exception, a successor corporation retains 
liability for injuries caused by its predecessor's products where the totality of the 
transaction between the successor and predecessor demonstrates a basic continuity of 
enterprise. See 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 133 (1996); see also Garcia, 933 
P.2d at 247; Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co,, 244 N.W.2d 873, 875, 877-84 (Mich. 
1976). Thus, the "' continuation of enterprise analysis seeks to establish whether there 
is a substantial continuity of pretransaction and posttransaction business activities 
resulting from the use of the acquired assets.'5' Garcia, 933 P.2d at 247 (quoting 1 
Timothy E. Travers et al, American Law of Products Liability §7:20 at 37 (3rd ed. 
1994)). Factors used to evaluate whether the circumstances evidence a continuity of 
enterprise include (1) whether the successor corporation is a continuation of assets, 
management and general business operations; (2) whether the selling corporation 
dissolves shortly after the transfer of assets; and (3) whether the successor corporation 
holds itself out as a continuation of the previous enterprise. See 63 Am. Jur. 2d 
Products Liability § 133 (\996)\see also Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84. 
c. FACTS SUPPORTING MERE CONTINUATION, PRODUCT LINE AND 
CONTINUITY OF ENTERPRISE THEORIES OF LIABILITY 
Metal Ware's president and corporate secretary provided abundant testimony 
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supporting several exceptions to the traditional rule of non-liability of successor 
corporations. American Harvest sold its assets to Metal Ware's shell company, Newco 
of Two Rivers, Inc. See R. at Tabors' Fed. App. 489 (Drumm Depo. at 17:7-23). 
Newco existed solely to acquire the assets of American Harvest, and after it acquired 
the assets it even changed its name to American Harvest. See id. at 489-90 (Drumm 
Depo. at 17:24-18:24& 19:5 to21:12). This new American Harvest entity was created 
as a subsidiary of Metal Ware, and it only existed for a few weeks until it merged with 
Metal Ware shortly after the transaction. See id. at 490-91 (Drumm Depo. at 21:19 to 
22:15). Moreover, Wesley Drumm, the president of Metal Ware, was also the 
president of Newco during its short existence prior to Newco adopting the American 
Harvest name and its merger with Metal Ware. See id. at 489-90 (Drumm Depo. at 
17:13 to 18:24). American Harvest went bankrupt within a week of the April 1997 
asset purchase. See id. at 506 (Drumm Depo. at 83:13-20). Prior to the asset purchase, 
Metal Ware's president was aware of the USCPSC recall. See R. at Tabors' Fed. App. 
512 (Drumm Depo. at 106:4-16). 
Metal Ware intended to purchase American Harvest's assets and continue 
manufacturing and selling the American Harvest food dehydrators under the American 
Harvest brand name. See id. at 494 (Drumm Depo. at 34:7-23), 500 (Drumm Depo. at 
61:13-22), 506 (Drumm Depo. at 82:15 to 83:12), 511-12 (Drumm Depo. at 105:24 to 
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106:3). Metal Ware, which prior to the asset purchase did not manufacture or sell 
dehydrators, wanted to acquire the American Harvest food dehydrator line because 
American Harvest food dehydrators enjoyed considerable name recognition in the 
market. See id. at 495-96 (Drumm Depo. at 41:25 to 42:3), 510 (Drumm Depo. at 
101:14-22), 513 (Drumm Depo. at 113:16-21). Metal Ware retained many of 
American Harvest's key employees, the companies had nearly identical distribution 
channels, and American Harvest's founders, David Dornbush and Chad Erickson, 
continued on with Metal Ware. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 278-79; see also R. at 
Tabors' Fed. App. 508 (Drumm Depo. at 91:22 to 92:23) and 511 (Drumm Depo. at 
102:23 to 103:20). After the asset purchase, Metal Ware sent numerous letters to 
American Harvest's former customers, retailers, distributors, and service centers 
indicating Metal Ware's intent to honor the warrantied and nonwarrantied repairs of 
American Harvest dehydrators. SeeR. at Farmers' Fed. App. 308 (WI 0376, Bonheyo 
letter to Service Center Representatives), id. at 310 (WI 0993, Wendorff letter to 
Retailers), and id. 312-22 (WI 0995 to WI 1005, Service Center Representative 
packet). 
Since the asset purchase, Metal Ware has presented itself as American Harvest 
in the marketplace, has sold food dehydrators under the American Harvest trademark 
and enjoys the benefits of American Harvest's goodwill. See R. at Tabors' Fed. App. 
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508 (Drumm Depo. at 92:20 to 93:9), 511 (Drumm Depo. at 105:6-19); see also R. at 
Farmers' Fed. App. 302 (Youngchild Depo. at 16:14 to 17:21). Following the asset 
purchase, Metal Ware continued to derive revenue from sales of American Harvest 
products manufactured prior to the asset purchase. See R. at Tabors' Fed. App. 513 
(Drumm Depo. at 111:16-21). 
In short, under the mere continuation, product line and continuity of enterprise 
exceptions to the traditional rule of successor non-liability, there is substantial evidence 
demonstrating Metal Ware should retain strict liability for this dangerous product, 
which Metal Ware knew to have been defective, even if the product was manufactured 
and sold by American Harvest. At the time of the asset purchase, which left American 
Harvest bankrupt, Metal Ware intended, and to this date continues, to sell the same line 
of food dehydrators under the American Harvest name. Inasmuch as American 
Harvest went bankrupt immediately following the asset purchase, the Tabors and 
Farmers are left without a remedy if Metal Ware is permitted to escape strict products 
liability despite its full knowledge of the problems assocated with the dehydrators. 
B. UTAH LAW IMPOSES UPON SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS A POST-SALE DUTY 
TO WARN OF PRODUCT DEFECTS IN A PREDECESSOR'S MANUFACTURED 
PRODUCTS 
The United States District Court previously held that Utah law would recognize 
a successor corporation's independent duty to warn, and specifically held that Metal 
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Ware had an independent duty to warn under the facts and circumstances of this case. 
See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. pp.72-76. In doing so, the court looked to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 A, which Utah has adopted. See House v. Armour 
of America, Inc., 929 P.2d 340,343 (Utah 1996); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel 
Co., 601 P.2d 152, 156-58 (Utah 1979) (adopting Section 402); see also Slisze v. 
Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317,321 (Utah 1999) (recognizing "duty to warn against a 
product's latent hazards that are known to the manufacturer"). Further, the trial court 
looked for guidance to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Florom v. Elliot 
Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989), in which the federal appellate court upheld the 
doctrine of successor liability for failure to warn. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 72-76 
(citing additional case law supporting successor corporation independent duty to warn). 
Under Utah's products liability law, Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6, an inadequate 
warning regarding a product is one of three grounds for strict liability imposed on 
manufacturers. See House v. Armour of America, Inc., 886 P.2d 542,547 (Utah 1994). 
"[A] manufacturer who knows or should know of a risk associated with its product 
may be directly liable to the user if it fails to warn adequately of the danger." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
In the context of successor liability, where a company purchases only the assets 
of a corporation and yet also maintains a continuing relationship with the former 
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corporation's customers, courts have imposed on the successor company the same duty 
to warn of a product's defective or dangerous condition. See Florom, 879 F.2d 801, 
802 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Florom v. Elliot Mfg., 867 F.2d at 576-77; 
Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195, 199 (N.Y. 1983); Garcia, 933 
P.2d at 250 ("a duty to warn arises when a relationship exists between him upon whom 
the duty falls and a dangerous situation to be warned against."). Importantly, the duty 
to warn is independent of any contractual or other relationship that the successor 
corporation has with its predecessor: "The duty to warn is an independent duty not 
determined by the contractual agreement between the predecessor-seller and 
successor-buyer corporations'' 879 F.2d at 802 (emphasis added) (quoting L.R. 
Fumer, M.L Friedman, Products Liability, § 2.06 [5] (1988)); see also Garcia, 933 
P.2d at 250. More particularly, "a duty arises only when there is a nexus between the 
successor corporation, its predecessor's customers, and the allegedly defective product. 
The key inquiry is whether there are sufficient facts to warrant an inference that the 
successor corporation had actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect." Garcia, 
933 P.2d at 250. Thus, "'a duty to warn arises when a relationship exists between him 
upon whom the duty falls and the dangerous situation to be warned against.'" Id. 
(emphasis added) (quoting Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443,449 (7th Cir. 1977)); 
see also Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 866 (9th Cir.1980) ("[A] successor 
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corporation may acquire an independent duty to warn where defects in a predecessor's 
products come to its attention," particularly where there has been a "continuation of the 
relationship between the successor and the customers of the successor."). 
Utah law supports the adoption of an independent duty of a successor 
corporation to warn of known product defects. Specifically, Utah has adopted the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which includes the duty to warn. See Ernest 
W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152,156-58 (Utah 1979) (adopting Section 
402). Section 402 A recognizes three bases for strict products liability: "design defects, 
manufacturing flaws, and inadequate warnings regarding use." House, 886 P.2d at 
547, see also Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6 (inadequate warning as basis for product 
liability). Under the facts of this case, there is no reason to justify a successor 
corporation's failure to warn consumers of a known product defect. 
The record evidence obtained from Metal Ware overwhelmingly demonstrates 
that Metal Ware had both actual and constructive knowledge of the heating coil defect, 
which was the issue of the USCPSC recall, and failed to provide any warnings of this 
defect and ongoing danger to consumers. Following the April 1997 purchase of 
American Harvest's assets, Metal Ware received numerous file cabinets and pallets of 
documents directly related to the USCPSC recall of the FD-50 food dehydrators. 
Included within these documents were two letters from the USCPSC imposing a 
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continuing duty to maintain a corrective action program in regard to the defective 
dehydrators and to notify the USCPSC of any further reports of product defects. 
Further, Metal Ware's president, Wesley Drumm, testified repeatedly that he was well 
aware of the product recall at the time that he purchased American Harvest's assets. 
After the asset purchase was finalized, Metal Ware retained many of American 
Harvest's key employees, including its founders, and also sent numerous letters to 
American Harvest's former customers, retailers, distributors, and service centers 
notifying of their intent to honor the warrantied and nonwarrantied repairs of American 
Harvest dehydrators. 
Thereafter, though nearly a year prior to the fire and substantial losses suffered 
by the Tabors, Metal Ware received notice of a house fire in Oklahoma caused by an 
American Harvest food dehydrator. Moreover, Metal Ware has maintained an ongoing 
and undeniable relationship with many of American Harvest's customers, including 
distributor Englewood and retailer Shopko, which continued to generate millions of 
dollars in sales for Metal Ware. Nonetheless, despite their irrefutable pre-asset 
purchase knowledge of the product defect and ongoing relationship with American 
Harvest's customers, Metal Ware did absolutely nothing to warn said customers and, 
ultimately, consumers like the Tabors of the danger associated with the product's use. 
Thus, at all relevant times, Metal Ware maintained a direct relationship with the 
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predecessor American Harvest's customers and assumed the responsibility of repairing 
defects in American Harvest's products. See Garcia, 933 P.2d at 250. Metal Ware 
was also on notice of the duty imposed by the USCPSC to continue a remedial action 
program to address the product defect involved in the recall. Metal Ware had sample 
recall packets with information directly aimed at contacting non-registered consumers. 
Finally, Metal Ware had direct knowledge of the product defect involved in the recall, 
including the defect's causing of a December 1997 house fire in Oklahoma, though did 
absolutely nothing to warn consumers prior to the fire that destroyed the Tabors' home 
in December 1998. See Garcia, 933 P.2d at 250; Travis, 565 F.2d at 449. For these 
reasons, Metal Ware had a duty to warn. 
1. FACTORS RELEVANT TO DETERMINING WHETHER METAL WARE 
DISCHARGED ITS DUTY TO WARN 
Regardless of whether Metal Ware knew, or should have known of the Tabors' 
existence, which is a fact question remaining in this matter, Metal Ware still had a duty 
to make efforts to warn consumers, which Metal Ware failed to discharge. As 
recognized in House v. Armour of America, Inc., "[a] manufacturer who knows or 
should know of a risk associated with its product may be directly liable to the user if it 
fails to warn adequately of the danger." 886 P.2d at 547 (emphasis added). Naturally, 
the user of the product is the end consumer, like the Tabors. At all times, the key 
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inquiry is whether there are sufficient facts to warrant an inference that the successor 
corporation had actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect. Garcia, 933 P.2d at 
250. Thus, as stated above, '"a duty to warn arises when a relationship exists between 
him upon whom the duty falls and the dangerous situation to be warned against.'" Id. 
{quoting Travis, 565 F.2d at 449). 
Several courts have dismissed similar arguments to those advanced by Metal 
Ware that a successor corporation has no duty to warn an end user where the end user 
was purportedly unknown. For example, in Freeman v. United Cities Propane Gas, 
807 F. Supp. 1533 (M.D. Ga. 1992), the court ruled: 
Mobil and Petrolane argue that it did not have a practical and 
effective means to warn Plaintiff about odor fade because it sold its 
product in bulk. They had no containers in which to place warnings. See 
Walkerv. Merck & Co., 648 F. Supp. 931, 934 (M.D. Ga. 1986). They 
had no way of knowing who the ultimate consumer would be. In fact, 
neither Mobil nor Petrolane had contact with the actual consumer. 
The argument put forward by these Defendants ignores two very 
easy alternatives that would have satisfied its duty to warn Mr. Freeman. 
First, they could have contracted with the intermediary to require the 
retailer to warn its consumer. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 
498F.2dl264,1116(5ihCix.)cert, denied, 419US. 1096,95 S.Ct. 687, 
42 L.Ed.2d 688 (1974). In the alternative, they could have furnished 
United Cities with a large warning sign that contained the necessary 
information and instructed United Cities to place the sign in a 
prominent place where the consumer would be sure to see it 
What Mobil or Petrolane could have done is relevant, and 
important, because the standard requires "no practical and effective 
means" to warn. Stuckey, 874 F.2d at 1571 (emphasis added). All that 
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Plaintiff must prove to prevail under this part of the instruction is the 
existence of one alternative that is both practical and effective. The 
evidence in the record is open to sufficiently differentinterpretationsto 
create a genuine issue of material fact on this issue. 
Id. at 1538. Similarly, in Khan v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 711 S.W. 2d 310 (Tex. App. 
1986), the court recognized a manufacturer's duty to warn a retailer (Miss Phoebe) 
extended to the ultimate consumer (Khan) where the manufacturer failed to adequately 
warn the retailer: 
We agree with the reasoning of the cited cases with respect to Velsicol's 
duty to warn the Khans, as distinguished from a duty to warn Miss 
Phoebe and its employees. The alleged defect in this case was not the 
contents of the container but its label, which the Khans never saw and 
would never have seen in the ordinary course of use of the product by 
Miss Phoebe. Because Velsicol had no practicable method of warning 
the Khans or giving them instructions concerning the safe use of the 
product, the Khans1 claim must rest on a duty to provide adequate 
warnings or instructions to Miss Phoebe. Velsicol cannot escape liability 
to the Khans if it failed to give adequate warnings or instructions to Miss 
Phoebe. See Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969). 
711 S.W.2d at 314 (emphasis added); cf Hiner v. Deere & Co., 340 P.2d 1191,1194 
(1(T Cir. 2003) ("A plaintiffbringing a post-sale warning defect claim 'must make an 
initial showing that the manufacturer acquired knowledge of a defect present but 
unknown and unforeseeable at the point of sale and failed to take reasonable action to 
warn of the defect.'" (Citation omitted.)) See also, R. at 10th Circuit Reply Brief of 
Appellants Timothy A. and Debra J. Tabor and Farmers Insurance at 7-15 (discussing 
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Plaintiffs reduced burden of proof in failure to warn cases). 
Additionally, Utah has adopted the heeding presumption, under which the court 
must assume that the Tabors would have adhered to any warning given by Metal 
Ware/ See House, S86?.2d at 547; see also Colegrovev. Cameron Machine Co., Ill 
F. Supp. 2d 611, 617 (W.D. Pa. 2001) ("To recover under § 402A, [a plaintiff] must 
establish that the alleged defect was the proximate cause of his injuries."... However, 
the plaintiff in a strict liability failure to warn case "is aided in making his case by a 
rebuttable presumption that a warning, if given, would have been heeded."); Veloso v. 
Western Bedding Supply Co., 281 F. Supp. 2d 743,748 (D. N.J. 2003) (recognizing the 
heeding presumption "presumes that an individual would have followed an adequate 
warning had such a warning been provided"); U.S. Silica Co. v. Tompkins, 92 S. W.3d 
605, 608 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) ("In the absence of a warning, a rebuttable presumption 
arises that the user would have heeded the warning had one been provided."); see also 
Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat1'I Bank, 332N.E.2d 820,826 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1975) (holding the heeding presumption "would discourage those manufacturers 
who would rather risk liability than provide a warning which would impair the 
2
 In Decius v. Action Collection Service, 105 P.3d 956,960 If 16 (Utah Ct. App. 2004), 
the court also opined that "strict liability permits a plaintiff to forgo proving causation, 
which is otherwise required in tort cases. The expansion of successor liability is in line 
with that element of strict liability—a plaintiff does not need to prove that the 
successor caused the injury." 
32 
marketability of the product"), rev1 d on procedural grounds, 358 N.E.2d 974 (1976). 
In House v. Armour of America, Inc., 929 P.2d at 347, the Utah Supreme Court 
declared that a "heeding presumption... serves to reinforce the basic duty to warn—to 
encourage manufacturers to produce safer products, and to alert users of the hazards 
arising from the use of those products through effective warnings." The majority of 
jurisdictions adopt a heeding presumption in products liability duty to warn cases. See, 
e.g. Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 397 F.3d 906,918 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding 
under Kansas law, "An inadequate warning creates a presumption of causation."); Eck 
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256F.3d 1013,1018 (10th Cir. 2001)(holding under Oklahoma 
law that "[w]here a consumer, whose injury the manufacturer should have reasonably 
foreseen, is injured by a product sold without a required warning, a rebuttable 
presumption will arise that the consumer would have read any warning provided by the 
manufacturer, and acted so as to minimize the risks"); Tenbarge v. Ames Taping Tool 
Sys., Inc., 190 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Under Missouri law, a rebuttable 
presumption that adequate warnings would have been heeded arises if the plaintiff 
shows that no warning was given.");i?/c/zterv. Limaxlnt'l, Inc., 45 F.3d 1464,1472 
(10 Cir. 1995) (holding under Kansas law, where heeding presumption exists, 
plaintiff does not have burden to demonstrate what warning would have been 
effective). Even the comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts support for this 
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position: "In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the 
seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use 
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and 
heeded." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(a), comment (j). The reverse 
presumption then is also true—had Metal Ware given a warning, the Tabors would 
have read such a notice and adhered to the same. Cf. House, 929 P.2d at 347 
("[A]bsent adequate warnings, Lt. House may have felt more confident than he should 
have and may have taken additional risks which, had he known the true limitations of 
this vest, he would have minimized or avoided,"). 
In the context of a heeding presumption, "[t]o make a submissible case on 
causation, the plaintiff must show that the product caused his injuries and that a 
warning would have altered his behavior." Tenbarge, 190 F.3d at 866. There is no 
requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate what type of warning would have been 
adequate. 
Of particular importance and relevance to Metal Ware's duty to warn the 
Tabors, Metal Ware had in its possession, at all relevant times, packets which were 
sent to American Harvest retailers of the FD-50 food dehydrators describing the 
USCPSC consumer notification and remedial action plan and advising of the means 
available to retailers to warn non-registered consumers of the products defects "with 
34 
notices posted in retail stores and through the general media via a press release." See 
R. atFarmers' Fed. App. 353 & id. at351-360. Thus, Metal Ware could have issued a 
press release of posted notices in the retail stores in which the products were sold, 
including Utah Shopko stores. 
On that issue, Shopko's representative^ Shelly Schroeder, clearly indicated what 
Shopko would have done had it received a proper warning from Metal Ware. 
Specifically, Schroeder testified that Shopko would have followed its policies and 
procedures established to handle any product recall. Namely, (1) there would have 
been a meeting with counsel to discuss a plan of action in response to the warning 
notice from Metal Ware,see R. at Farmers' Fed App. 236 (Schroeder Depo. at 44:4-
20), (2) notice would have been given to consumers by means of posting signs in 
Shopko's retail stores, see R. at Farmers' Fed App. 236-37 (Schroeder Depo. at App. 
44:23 to 45:18 & 46:4-11), (3) notice would also have been posted at the customer 
services desk and maintained for a period of 90 to 120 days, see R. at Farmers' Fed 
App. 237 (Schroeder Depo. at 46:12-25), and, (4) given the severity of the risk 
associated with the defective dehydrator, all remaining units would have been pulled 
from Shopko's shelves, see R. atFarmers' Fed App. 237-38 (Schroeder Depo. at App. 
49:22 to 50:7). Regardless, Metal Ware did nothing. 
Despite Metal Ware's knowledge of the product recall, knowledge of the 
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Oklahoma house fire, and knowledge of procedures directlyaimed at contacting end 
users, Metal Ware did absolutely nothing to warn the Tabors of the defective 
dehydrator. Indeed, the federal district court acknowledged that Metal Ware had ample 
opportunity and means to give a warning via retail store posted notices, the media and 
newspapers, and yet failed to do so: 
Finally, Defendants knew that American Harvest had followed the 
USCPSC's course of action to target end purchasers for whom neither 
American Harvest nor its customers (retailers) had no record of purchase 
and could not identify.... To inform these unidentified end purchasers 
of the recall, American Harvest advised its customers to post notices 
throughout their retail stores and "in the general media" such as "press 
release[s]" and newspapers. Further Defendants knew that the USCPSA 
"request[ed]" that American Harvest continue its corrective actions to 
inform end purchasers until "as many products as possible have been 
removed from the marketplace." 
R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 76. Under these facts, regardless of the test imposed for 
determining whether a manufacturer took reasonable steps to warn a consumer, Utah 
law supports a finding that Metal Ware failed to discharge its duty to warn Englewood, 
Shopko and the Tabors. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Under the facts of this case, Appellant Farmers Insurance Company respectfully 
submits that Utah law should recognize the mere continuation, product line and 
continuity of enterprise exceptions to the traditional rule of successor corporation non-
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liability. Moreover, Utah law does support an independent duty on a successor 
corporation, regardless of the contractual relationship between the predecessor and 
successor, in instances where the successor obtains knowledge of an ongoing danger of 
the predecessor's product. 
X. STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
This matter presents issues of first impression in the State of Utah in regard to 
the duties of a successor corporation sounding in strict liability and a successor 
corporation's independent duty to warn consumers of product defects. The litigation 
has spanned six years and is fact intensive. For these reasons, Farmers Insurance 
requests oral argument be scheduled in this matter. 
XL ADDENDUM NOT NECESSARY 
No Addendum is necessary under Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1). 
XII. JOINDER IN TABORS' APPELLATE BRIEF 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(i), Appellant Farmers Insurance Company 
hereby gives notice of its joinder in and adoption of the statements of fact and legal 
arguments set forth in the brief filed by Timothy A. Tabor and Debra J. Tabor in this 
matter. 
37 
th RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, on this 26m day of September 2006 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 
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DUNN^fDUNN, P.C. 
505 East 200 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-6666 
Facsimile: (801) 521-9998 
imav@dunndunn.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Farmers Insurance Company 
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